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Abstract
Are we able to infer what happened to a person from a brief sample of his/her behaviour? It has been proposed that
mentalising skills can be used to retrodict as well as predict behaviour, that is, to determine what mental states of a target
have already occurred. The current study aimed to develop a paradigm to explore these processes, which takes into account
the intricacies of real-life situations in which reasoning about mental states, as embodied in behaviour, may be utilised. A
novel task was devised which involved observing subtle and naturalistic reactions of others in order to determine the event
that had previously taken place. Thirty-five participants viewed videos of real individuals reacting to the researcher behaving
in one of four possible ways, and were asked to judge which of the four ‘scenarios’ they thought the individual was
responding to. Their eye movements were recorded to establish the visual strategies used. Participants were able to deduce
successfully from a small sample of behaviour which scenario had previously occurred. Surprisingly, looking at the eye
region was associated with poorer identification of the scenarios, and eye movement strategy varied depending on the
event experienced by the person in the video. This suggests people flexibly deploy their attention using a retrodictive
mindreading process to infer events.
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Introduction
When two people are engaged in social interaction, they each
react to the behaviour of the other, and these reactions could
manifest as humour, irritation, sympathy, bashfulness, to name a
few. Can we guess what provoked a reaction just by observing a
person’s behaviour? If so, this might qualify as an instance of what
Gallese and Goldman [1] called ‘retrodiction’, which is a kind of
backwards inference from a mental state to its causal antecedent.
In this case, the mental state is embodied in a reaction (humour,
irritation, sympathy, bashfulness, etc). Can participants guess, for
example, what caused a person to manifest irritation? If so, then
participants would effectively have access to an aspect of the world
through the lens of another person’s mind (as embodied in
behaviour). Indeed, the participants could perhaps learn some-
thing about a third party, by observing the effect the third party
had on another person. This would be an important faculty in that
participants could use other minds as a way of broadening their
apprehension of the world – in this particular case, the social
world. Apparently, this would qualify as a significant benefit of the
participants’ capacity for mentalising, or imputing mental states.
Currently, not much research uses tasks that have presented
participants with a sample of behaviour and asked them to infer or
to ‘retrodict’ the situation that resulted in that behaviour (although
see Robinson & Mitchell [2] for an exception). Another aspect of
understanding minds in the real world is that not all people will
respond to the same situation in the same way (the diversity
problem). One-to-one correspondence between situation and
behaviour in real life is uncommon and we might assume that
the mental states that mediate between situation and behaviour
will also vary. Laboratory tasks that involve behavioural prediction
tend to artificially generate one-to-one correspondence between
situation and behaviour, ignoring this important feature. Para-
digms are required that instead take account of this variability in
responses with a view to discovering how we flexibly understand
the behaviour of others, even where it departs from how we would
be inclined to act ourselves.
Some researchers have circumnavigated these issues by
presenting participants with samples of behaviour (usually facial
expressions) and asking them to identify the mental state of the
individual concerned [3], usually without any further inference to
the antecedent situation. Proponents of this approach have argued
that mental states (such as admire, thoughtfulness, scheme) can be
directly observable from facial expressions. They also argue that in
our everyday lives we understand the mental states of others
through a combination of high-level and low-level mentalising
processes. High-level processes involve reasoning in a ‘‘top-down’’
fashion about mental states based on our prior knowledge of the
relationships between mental states and situations. For example,
based on our prior knowledge about the relationship between what
a person sees and what they know, we might reason that someone
has a false belief about an object being in a particular location
because that individual did not witness it being moved elsewhere.
In contrast, low-level mentalising processes involve ‘‘bottom-up’’
recognition of cues or indicators such as eye gaze behaviour or
facial expressions [3]. The mechanisms for these two processes
may well be different: mirror neurons have been proposed as a
possible basis for low-level mentalising processes, while high-level
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mentalising is more likely to be grounded in a propositional (non-
bodily) format [4]. Retrodictive mindreading as described above
might involve a combination of these processes. We may well
recognise and decode the behaviour via a bodily format of
representation, a relatively low-level process. However, this must
be at some point integrated with some prior knowledge of
situations that may give rise to that kind of feeling.
The stimuli used in studies involving identifying mental states
from facial expressions have also been criticised for the following
reasons. In real life, the behaviour we are trying to understand
may be subtle. For example, facial expressions are often dynamic
and brief. Most studies have not taken these considerations into
account and have tended to portray static images of emotional
responses, often displayed for several seconds [5]. As the
expressions in such studies are posed by actors, the ‘‘correct’’
answer as to what that person is thinking or feeling is usually
determined by consensus of viewers and may bear no relation to
the actual mental state of the actor in question. As no event or
situation in the world has given rise to the expression (other than
the actor being asked to pose by the researcher), it is unclear how
well results of such studies can inform us about the processes we
use when reasoning about the relationship between an event or
situation and observable behaviour.
In recognition of this last point some researchers have
developed more naturalistic stimuli where expressions have either
been induced or recorded in a real-world setting. For example,
Matsumoto, Olide, Schug, Willingham and Callan [6] used facial
expressions of athletes, captured at the end of Olympic Judo
matches. While we can be more confident that the individuals
reacting in studies such as this are experiencing some kind of
mental state, a problem remains in knowing the correct answer.
Even if the individual him/herself is asked what he/she was
thinking or feeling we cannot know for certain whether the verbal
report is an accurate representation of the mental state experi-
enced. Besides, the individual may feel a blend of emotions,
thoughts, desires and so on, many of which cannot easily be
described in words. It may also be that it is easier to perceive or
interpret the behaviour of an individual than to generate a mental
state label that adequately captures an impression of his or her
experience. Moreover, the very act of trying to verbalise what
another person might be thinking or feeling could interfere with
our ability to spontaneously interpret their behaviour in context.
Concerns about difficulties associated with naming mental states
(in this case, belief states) were taken into consideration by
Wimmer and Perner [7] when they devised the now widely known
unexpected transfer test of false belief, in which child participants
are invited to predict where a protagonist will search for chocolate
(and are not asked to make any direct inferences about the
protagonist’s belief state). In this task, participants must reflect on
the belief state of the protagonist in order to predict his/her
behaviour, but are not required to name or refer to any belief state
directly. While that research undoubtedly represented a major
breakthrough, it is open to the criticisms mentioned previously (i.e.
one-to-one correspondence between situation and behaviour).
The research reported in this paper aimed to develop a
paradigm that approximates many of the demands of real life
situations where mental state reasoning might be required, and to
address some of the criticisms that might be levelled against
previous research. Participants were shown people’s natural (and
somewhat subtle) reactions to four specific events (which we will
refer to as scenarios), all of which were filmed during an
interaction with the researcher, and asked to identify which of
the four events had previously occurred. To succeed at this task, it
is necessary to retrodict, that is, to reason backwards from
behaviour to infer a situation that had already happened.
Participants were not asked to identify the mental state of the
individuals explicitly, thus overcoming any concerns about their
being able to verbalise or label their inner subjective states and
avoiding the possibility of our ‘‘instructing’’ participants to use a
mentalising strategy. Instead, participants were required to identify
the situation, about which there was a definite objectively correct
answer. If a small sample of behaviour is sufficient for people to get
a feel for what circumstance may have led to that behaviour, then
we predict that participants would systematically identify which of
the four specific events had previously occurred to the people in
the videos that they viewed.
We also recorded participants’ eye movements while viewing
the videos. Previous research has suggested that when viewing
static images containing people, individuals look more at the eye
region compared to the rest of the face [8]. Also, when freely
viewing videos containing people, both adults [9] and young
children [10] tend to spend the majority of their time looking at
the eye region of the face. Moreover, the eye region may convey
crucial information for tasks that involve trying to name emotions
or mental states from images of faces [3]. Given the importance of
the eye region in previous research, we predicted that participants
would spend more of their time looking at the eye region than the
mouth region of the faces of the people in the videos. We also
hypothesised that time spent looking at the eye region would
correlate with successful identification of the event that had
previously occurred. In other words, we predicted that participants
who spent more time looking at the eye region when viewing the
videos would have the greatest success at identifying the scenarios.
We also hypothesised that this relationship would hold for each of
the scenarios i.e. we predicted that time spent looking at the eye
region when viewing a particular scenario would positively
correlate with identification of that scenario.
Methods
The entire procedure was approved by the Ethics Committee,
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham.
Stimulus development
The purpose of this stage of the study was to create stimuli to be
used in the main experiment. Participants were told that they
would be filmed while posing some facial expressions to act as
stimuli for another study. Unknown to the participants, the real
aim was to record their responses to an aspect of the researcher’s
behaviour that occurred prior to recording the posed expressions.
More details are provided below.
Participants. Forty participants (19 males and 21 females)
aged between 19 and 34 (mean age = 22.2 years) from University
of Nottingham were filmed reacting to an apparently incidental
aspect of the researcher’s behaviour. Participants were of various
nationalities: 16 Malaysians, 12 British, 1 Spanish, 1 Vietnamese,
1 Sri Lankan, 1 Botswanan, 1 Indian, 1 Italian, 1 Irish, 1 Nigerian,
1 Polish, 1 Chinese, 1 Ugandan, and 1 Lithuanian. Written
informed consent was obtained from all participants.
Materials and apparatus. A spacious room within the
School of Psychology was utilised. Participants sat with their back
towards the main door and windows (so as to avoid distractions).
The researcher sat across the table from the participant.
A Sony DCR-TRV460 video camera was used to film
participants. The camera was positioned approximately 1.7 meters
from the participant and was placed directly next to the researcher
on a tripod. The camera was positioned in order for the
participant’s face, neck, shoulders, and chest to be seen.
Scenario Identification from Natural Reactions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 November 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 11 | e49859
Procedure. Participants were told that they would be filmed
while posing specific facial expressions which would be used as
video stimuli in a subsequent study. Four scenarios were created,
one of which was performed by the researcher to each participant.
The scenarios were devised with a view to eliciting a range of
responses from participants. We aimed to create events that would
provoke a reaction but would be unlikely to cause a major
disturbance in the mood of the participant. Scenarios also needed
to be plausible within the context of an experiment, as it was
important that participants did not guess that the researcher was
acting.
Scenario 1 (Joke): As the participant was ready and waiting to
start the experiment, the researcher initiated a short casual chat
with him/her. The researcher then shared a simple joke with the
participant. The joke was:
‘‘Why did the woman wear a helmet at the dinner table? Because she
was on a crash diet!’’
Scenario 2 (Waiting): As the participant was ready and waiting
to start the experiment, the researcher kept the participant waiting
for about 5–8 minutes while she performed other irrelevant tasks
(i.e. making a phone call, texting on a mobile phone, having a
drink of water) while sitting in front of the participant.
Scenario 3 (Story): As the participant was waiting to start the
experiment, the researcher began to relate a story about a series of
misfortunes she experienced earlier that day, such as missed the bus
to university, left mobile phone at home, caught in rain with no umbrella, and
flashdrive containing important work malfunctions.
Scenario 4 (Compliments): As the participant was waiting to
start the experiment, the researcher gave instructions regarding
the experiment. While doing so, the researcher offered a series of
compliments. Examples are:
i. Really nice pair of earrings you have there
ii. You’ve got really good hair, what shampoo do you use?
iii. That shirt really brings out the colour of your eyes!
As the real aim was to record participants’ immediate responses
to the four scenarios, the video camera was set to record as soon as
participants were seated; participants were unaware the camera
was recording at this stage. At the completion of any one of the
four scenarios mentioned above, participants were asked to look
directly at the video camera and to form six facial expressions
(surprise, happy, fear, anger, sad, disgust). The facial expression words
were dictated by the researcher in the same order each time. As
the participants were unaware that filming had already begun, the
researcher pretended to switch on the camera prior to dictating
the facial expression words. Once the participants had completed
posing the six expressions, the researcher turned off the video
camera. Prior to leaving the testing room, participants were
debriefed about the true nature of the study and were given the
opportunity to ask any questions. Participants’ consent to use the
video recording of their reactions to the researcher in Scenario 1–4
was obtained. One participant did not provide consent and the
related recordings were destroyed immediately (this participant is
not included in the 40 stated above).
Editing. The footage was transferred from the video camera
to an Apple Macintosh computer using video-editing software,
iMovie HD 6. The videoclips were edited to capture participants’
reactions to the distinct scenarios at points where they were
deemed to be most expressive. Due to the naturalistic and
temporally distinct context of the scenarios, there was no clear way
of determining a definite start and end point to each reaction as
every individual responded uniquely to the varying scenarios. This
opened up the possibility of experimenter bias in picking the most
stereotypical responses as the editor was not blind to the scenarios
when viewing and editing the videoclips. Nevertheless, most of the
videos captured responses around the end of the scenario
enactment. The 40 edited videoclips (10 for each scenario) ranged
from 3.64 to 8.96 seconds, based on the dynamic nature of the
participants’ natural responses with the respective means being
Joke: 6.59 (SD= .26); Waiting: 6.84 (SD= .23); Story: 6.86
(SD= .37); Compliments: 5.81 (SD= .40). A one-way ANOVA
showed that the clip length did not vary systematically with the
scenarios (p= .116). Video frames were 720 pixels in width and
576 pixels in height. The rate of presentation was 25 frames per
second. The edited clips omitted the audio component as
participants’ verbal responses would have completely disambigu-
ated the reactions in many cases.
Main Experiment
Participants. Thirty-five participants (19 males and 16
females) aged between 18 and 35 (mean age = 22.37 years) took
part in this phase of the study. The experiment was conducted at
the University of Nottingham. Participants were of various
nationalities: 19 Malaysians, 7 British, 3 Sudanese, 1 Dutch, 1
Japanese, 1 Singaporean, 1 Indonesian, 1 Tanzanian, and 1
Chinese national. All were paid an inconvenience allowance and
written informed consent was obtained.
Materials and apparatus. Videoclips of the researcher
acting each of the four scenarios were filmed using a Sony
DCR-TRV460 video camera. The researcher looked directly at
the camera while acting. These videoclips of the researcher acting
out the scenarios were transferred from the video camera to an
Apple Macintosh computer using iMovie HD 6 software. They
were then edited using VirtualDub (v1.9.10) video capture and
video processing software. VirtualDub was used to create coloured
borders for each scenario clip: Scenario 1 (Joke)- Green border,
Scenario 2 (Waiting)- Red border, Scenario 3 (Story)- Blue border,
and Scenario 4 (Compliments)- Yellow border. The coloured
borders were 0.5 centimetres in width. Clips varied in length
according to the content of the social scene; Scenario 1 (Joke)- 11
seconds, Scenario 2 (Waiting)- 89 seconds, Scenario 3 (Story)-
34 seconds, and Scenario 4 (Compliments)- 27 seconds. These
variations in length were inevitable because of the dynamics of the
encounters themselves. Video frames were 720 pixels in width and
576 pixels in height. The rate of presentation was at 25 frames per
second. The bit rate for the audio track was 352 kbps.
The stimuli for this study were the 40 edited videoclips from the
Stimulus Development stage. All videos (both the researcher
enacting the scenarios and the participants’ reactions) were shown
on a 17 inch TFT monitor which was incorporated into the Tobii
T60 (data rate 60 Hz). The 40 stimuli were shown using Tobii
Studio Analysis Software. The software randomised the presen-
tation of the videoclips. Each videoclip was interspersed with an
image of a fixation point (white central cross on a black
background located at the centre of the screen). The fixation
point remained on the screen until the participant responded to
the previously presented videoclip. The Tobii T60 Eye Tracker
was used to record participants’ looking behaviour. The partic-
ipants sat approximately 60 centimetres from the monitor. The
video stimuli presented subtended a horizontal visual angle of
22.5u and a vertical visual angle of 11.4u.
To correspond with the scenario videoclips with coloured
borders, four matching flashcards with the dimensions 10
centimetres614 centimetres were created with borders of the
same colours. The names of each scenario (Joke, Waiting, Story,
Scenario Identification from Natural Reactions
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Compliments) were printed in black ink on white background. The
coloured borders on the flashcards were approximately 0.5
centimetres in width and were used to aid memory for the
scenarios as acted by the researcher. Only the scenario clips and
flashcards had corresponding coloured borders to aid memory
recall. The 40 edited videoclips did not have coloured borders.
The coloured borders in the scenario clips and flashcards could
have influenced participants to respond a certain way, e.g. to pick
the waiting scenario more often because they liked the colour red.
However, this would result in a higher false alarm rate, which is
taken into account by d-prime calculation.
Design. A within-subjects design was used, where all partic-
ipants viewed the four scenario videoclips followed by the 40
reaction expressions clips.
Procedure. Participants were tested individually in a quiet
room. The videoclips of the researcher enacting the four scenarios
were shown on the eye tracker screen. The scenarios were
presented in counterbalanced order and were only shown once to
participants at the start of the experiment. After the presentation
of each scenario videoclip, the corresponding flashcard for the
scenario was shown to the participants and placed on the table in
front of the monitor. The flashcards were thus displayed in the
same counterbalanced order as the scenario videos had been
presented. Presenting these scenario clips allowed participants to
experience as closely as possible the experience of the participants
in the Stimulus Development phase. As a result, participants had a
clear understanding of what each scenario entailed, with both
audio and visual information presented. Prior to the start of the
experiment, a 9-point calibration procedure was conducted in
which a moving red dot appeared in different locations on the
screen, including the centre, the four corners and the mid-points in
between. Following successful calibration, participants were shown
the 40 videoclips of reactions resulting from the scenarios in the
Stimulus Development phase, also on the Eye tracker monitor.
The presentation of the videoclips was randomised via Tobii
Studio Analysis Software. Participants were told to direct their
gaze at a central fixation point prior to the presentation of each of
the 40 videoclips, which was controlled via mouse-click by the
researcher. After the clip was shown, the fixation point reappeared
and participants were required to state which scenario they
thought the person in the video was reacting to by either
verbalising or pointing, using the flashcards as cues. The
researcher asked a question each time ‘‘Which of these events
had just happened?’’ and then briefly reminded the participants of
the four options verbally (i.e. in the same counterbalanced
sequence the scenario clips and flashcards were previously
presented), while pointing to the flashcards: ‘‘Is it the joke,
waiting, the story, or compliments?’’ The researcher recorded
participants’ responses on a data sheet. This process continued for
all 40 videoclips.
Results
Our primary question was whether participants could discrim-
inate between the four scenarios. Responses were analysed using a
signal detection procedure to account for any bias in responding
with a particular scenario. This generates an index d-prime (d9),
from the hit rate (the proportion of occasions on which the
participant correctly identified the scenario) and false alarm rate
(the proportion of occasions on which the participant identified the
scenario when it was the incorrect answer). In this experiment, the
hit rate was calculated for the ten trials comprising a particular
scenario, while the false alarm rate was calculated across the
remaining thirty trials which did not comprise that scenario. The
Snodgrass and Corwin [11] correction factor was applied to the hit
and false alarm rate calculations to correct for cells containing 0,
by adding 0.5 to all cells. d9 is then calculated by subtracting the z-
score for the false alarm rate from z-score of the hit rate [d9=Z(hit
rate)2Z(false alarm rate) where function Z(p), p M [0,1], is the
inverse of the cumulative Gaussian distribution. d9 is a measure of
the distance between signal and noise distributions and is
essentially an indicator of how well participants were able to
correctly discriminate each scenario from the others. Table 1
displays the mean accuracy rates, false alarm rates and d9 scores
for the four scenarios. If participants did not systematically
discriminate the correct scenarios, the hit rate would be equal to
the false alarm rate and their d9 score would be 0. d9 scores were
significantly greater than 0 for all four scenarios [Joke
t(34) = 12.61, p,.0005; Waiting t(34) = 20.83, p,.0005; Story
t(34) = 12.87, p,.0005; Compliments t(34) = 10.51, p,.0005],
indicating that participants were able to discriminate between
them in a systematic manner.
To establish if there were differences between the scenarios in
participants’ level of success, a one-way repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted on the d9 scores, with scenario as the
within-participants factor. There was a main effect of scenario,
F(3,102) = 87.87, p,.0005, Cohen’s f= 2.73 (large effect; [12]).
Posthoc t-tests with Bonferroni corrected alpha level of .0083
showed this was due to the Waiting scenario being easier to
discriminate than the other three scenarios (all ps,.0005). The
Story scenario also approached significance in being easier to
discriminate than the Compliments scenario (p= .009).
Eye tracking (gaze time) analyses
The purpose of the eye tracking analyses was to determine
whether participants’ ability to discriminate the scenarios correctly
was associated with looking at specific parts of the scene. The eye-
tracking data were processed using Tobii Studio 3.0’s dynamic
areas of interest (AOIs) function. This allows one to create AOIs
that move and change shape with the movements of objects in the
video. In order to calculate eye movement metrics, AOIs were
defined separately on the eye and mouth regions of the video
stimuli. The Total Fixation Duration (seconds) metric was used to
measure the total duration for all fixations within a) the eye region,
and b) the mouth region. Fixation is defined by the standard Tobii
fixation filter as two or more consecutive samples falling within a
35 pixel radius.
As the videoclips varied in length, the percentage of gaze time
spent on the eyes and mouth regions for each clip was used (i.e.
time spent looking at eye/mouth region4total gaze time * 100%).
As the data were not normally distributed (i.e. Shapiro-Wilks tests
showed that gaze time at the eye region was not normally
distributed for all 4 scenarios, all ps,.0005. This was due to mild
positive skew with all values ..14), the data were transformed
using a square root transformation for the purpose of analysis.
Following transformation, the data were normally distributed
(Shapiro-Wilks p..1). Figure 1 shows the mean gaze time (after
transformation) for the eye and mouth (as a percentage of total
gaze time) for each of the four scenarios (please note that the
standard errors bars in the figure reflect between-subject variance,
and are therefore not suitable for assessing within-subject
comparisons). A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on
gaze time, with scenario (Joke, Waiting, Story, Compliments) and
region of the face (eyes or mouth) as within-participants factors.
We included scenario as a factor due to the possibility that
participants would use different viewing strategies for the different
scenarios. There was no overall effect for scenario (p= .065),
However, there was an effect for face region, F(1,34) = 17.51,
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p,.0005, Cohen’s f= .69 (large effect), whereby participants spent
longer looking at the mouth region (M= 5.47, SD= 1.77) than the
eye region (M= 2.97, SD= 2.10). This was qualified by a
significant interaction between scenario and face region indicating
that gaze time to the critical regions (eyes and mouth) did vary
with scenario, F(3, 102) = 13.06, p,.0005, Cohen’s f= 1.02 (large
effect).
Further analyses were conducted to establish the basis of this
interaction. Separate one-way ANOVAs examined the effect of
scenario on gaze time at the eyes, and the mouth. There was a
significant effect of scenario on time spent looking at the eye
region, F(3,102) = 5.05, p= .018, Greenhouse Geisser corrected,
Cohen’s f= .59 (large effect). Posthoc t-tests with a Bonferroni
corrected alpha level of .0083 revealed that participants spent
more time looking at the eye region in the Waiting scenario
compared with the Story (p= .001) and Joke scenarios (p,.0005).
Similarly, there was a significant effect of scenario on time spent
looking at the mouth region, F(3,102) = 11.46, p,.0005, Green-
house Geisser corrected, Cohen’s f= .95 (large effect). Posthoc t-
tests with a Bonferroni corrected alpha level of .0083 revealed that
participants spent more time looking at the mouth region in the
Joke, Compliments, and Story scenarios compared with the
Waiting scenario (all ps,.0005).
Do variations in gaze pattern relate to accuracy in detecting the
scenario? Due to the Waiting scenario being easier to identify than
the other three scenarios and showing different eye gaze patterns,
it was analysed separately from the other three scenarios when
examining the relationship between gaze patterns and scenario
identification. This was to ensure that any apparent relationships
were not solely driven by performance in this particular condition.
Overall there was a significant negative correlation between mean
eye region gaze time and mean d9 scores (correct scenario
discriminability) across the remaining three scenarios, r=2.443,
n = 35, p= .008, suggesting that individuals who spent more time
looking at the eye region in general were less successful at
discriminating between the scenarios. The relationship between
mean mouth region gaze time and mean d9 scores was not
significant, r= .15, n = 35, p= .385; indicating no relationship
between looking at the mouth and successfully discriminating
between the scenarios. The same relationships were also investi-
gated for each scenario individually. In other words, for each
scenario we examined whether gaze time at the eye region for that
scenario related to d9 scores for the same scenario. Eye region gaze
time correlated negatively with d9 for the Compliments scenarios
(r=2.34, n = 35, p= .032) and the Story scenario (r= .44, n = 35,
p= .008) but not for the Joke scenario (r= .02, n = 35, p = .91). The
Waiting scenario was investigated separately, revealing a similar
pattern whereby eye region gaze time correlated negatively with d9
(r=2.45, n = 35, p= .006). There were no significant relationships
between gaze time at the mouth region and d9 for any of the four
scenarios.
Discussion
Participants were able to deduce from a relatively brief sample
of behaviour which of various situations the individual in question
had experienced. This implies that participants utilised successful
strategies to retrodict the ‘cause’ of the specified response [1],
despite considerable diversity in the manner in which people
reacted to each scenario. Thus, from observing just a few seconds
of a person’s reaction, it appears we can gauge what kind of event
Table 1. Participant mean accuracy rates, false alarm rates and d9 scores (correct scenario discriminability).
Number correct out of 10 (% in
brackets)
False alarms out of a possible 30 (% in
brackets) D9 (d-prime)
Joke 4.54 (45.4%) 3.69 (12.3%) 1.06
Waiting 9.00 (90.0%) 3.66 (12.2%) 2.49
Story 5.66 (56.6%) 3.86 (12.9%) 1.32
Compliments 5.11 (51.1%) 4.49 (15.0%) 1.05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049859.t001
Figure 1. Mean percentage of total gaze time (square root transformed) at the eye and mouth across four scenarios. Error bars report
standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049859.g001
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might have happened to that individual with considerable success.
It is not clear from the current results exactly how long a sample of
behaviour needs to be in order to support successful identification,
and this may be a question for future research. Nevertheless, this
capacity constitutes a powerful tool for learning about events in the
world, enabling us to benefit indirectly from the experiences of
others.
The Waiting scenario was identified more accurately in
comparison to the other scenarios. This could be due the nature
of the behavioural responses themselves, as the responses in the
Waiting scenario often included not only facial expressions but
also gestures that could assist in identifying the scenario, such as
yawning, sighing, or looking around. The other three scenarios
were identified somewhat less successfully, presumably because the
behaviours involved were more similar. For example, laughter was
a fairly frequent response for all three scenarios. This is one
shortcoming of a forced-choice procedure: success in selecting the
correct answer is inevitably influenced by how similar it is to other
incorrect options. The scenarios we selected for this study elicited a
range of reactions, but their degree of similarity was not easy to
anticipate.
An alternative explanation for the better discrimination for the
Waiting scenario is that the video of the researcher enacting this
scenario was longer than for the other three scenarios, because of
the nature of the event itself, which was a period of waiting. It is
not immediately obvious that a longer event would necessarily be
understood better than a shorter event, but we cannot rule this out
as a possibility. Nevertheless, the clips of the behavioural responses
themselves did not systematically vary in length with the scenario
experienced, so participants could not have used a low-level
strategy such as the length of the clip they viewed to discriminate
between the scenarios.
Eye movement analyses revealed that participants varied their
strategy according to the scenarios. For all four of the scenarios,
participants focused primarily on the mouth with less time spent
looking at the eyes. Nevertheless, for the Waiting scenario
participants spent slightly more time looking at the eyes and less
time looking at the mouth than for the other three scenarios,
suggesting that the eyes were more informative for this scenario
than the others. As discrimination was better in the Waiting
scenario and participants looked more at the eyes when viewing
this scenario than at the others, one might be tempted to conclude
that spending longer looking at the eyes does indeed result in
better identification. However, the increased looking at the eyes
may have been caused by features of the eye gaze behaviour of the
individuals in the videos. The people subjected to the Waiting
scenario were not in direct interaction with the researcher, and so
were more inclined to look around the scene rather than at the
researcher compared to individuals in the other scenarios. These
eye movements of the people in the videos may have attracted the
attention of the observers viewing them, and made the scenario
easy to recognise. Given that the relatively strong discrimination
performance in the Waiting scenario and the increased looking to
the eyes might have been the result of lower-level strategies such as
these, the relationship between gaze behaviour and scenario
discrimination was analysed separately for the Waiting scenario
and the other three (Joke, Compliments, Story).
Surprisingly, looking at the eye region was associated with
poorer identification for the three of the four scenarios and
unrelated for the fourth (Joke). These results suggest that the eyes
are not the most informative facial region when determining what
happened to the people in the videos. They stand in contradiction
to some studies which imply that typically developing individuals
look more at the eyes than the mouth when viewing videos of other
people [9] and appear to dispute previous studies which have
claimed that the eyes are crucial for mental state understanding
[3]. Instead, they suggest that participants may find different parts
of the face informative, depending on the specific situation. This is
consistent with Cunningham et al. [13] who reported that the
mouth region is central in communicating information about
certain mental states. More recently, Kirchner, Hatri, Heekeren
and Dziobek [14] reported increased fixation time in the mouth
region as compared to the eye region in emotional recognition
conditions (i.e. conditions high in social salience).
We have already mentioned that there are a number of
differences between the demands of the task reported here and
other mentalising tasks that have been reported previously. We
have argued that one of the strengths of this paradigm is that
participants were never asked to identify the mental state of the
individuals in the videos. It is possible that, if we had asked
participants to attempt to deduce the mental state, they might have
gazed more at the eye region. Alternatively, the preference for the
mouth could be a result of the dynamic nature of the videos.
Although the people in the videos were not interacting with the
participants who viewed them, they were interacting with the
researcher at the time of filming, who was sitting next to the
camera. This effectively placed the participants who viewed the
videos within the interaction, which represents a departure from
previous methodologies [9].
Before considering the broader implications of these findings,
there is a limitation of the current experiment that should be
noted. The use of flashcards as a cue to recalling the various
scenarios meant that we were unable to record response times for
the task. Although participants were not instructed to respond
quickly and were given as much time as they needed to make an
accurate decision, response times could potentially have given
additional information about how difficult participants found the
task. A further difficulty with using flashcards is the possibility that
some bias could have arisen from the researcher’s involvement in
the procedure. However, the order of presentation of the cards was
carefully counterbalanced to ensure that cues to the correct
response were not provided.
Is it possible that participants could infer what happened to the
person in the video without mentalising at all? An argument could
be advanced that participants ‘match’ behaviour to situation
according to a system of behavioural rules [15]. For example, is it
possible that participants associated a smiling face with the Joke
scenario? This seems implausible, given the wide range of
behavioural responses produced by the people in reaction to the
various scenarios: in most cases, there is no simple matching
between the scenario and the facial expression.
It has recently been argued that we may perform some
mentalising tasks such as recognising emotions through activation
of representations that have bodily formats (mirror neurons being
a main candidate for this), without generating any higher-level
propositional representations of mental states. Goldman and de
Vignemont [4] refer to this as ‘low-level mentalising’, but argue
that other non-embodied processes might be involved at later
stages of emotion recognition, such as at the stage of attributing
the emotion itself. Similarly, Gallese [16] acknowledges that
emotions can be understood via either an embodied process, or a
more explicit propositional route through ‘‘cognitive elaboration
of their visual properties’’. In our task where there was no
requirement to identify the mental states of the individuals in the
videos at all, a stronger case might be made for the more direct
route from observing the behaviour to understanding the situation.
Research with infants has demonstrated that by the age of one,
babies may be able to understand intentional goal-directed actions
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[17] and appear to show sensitivity to the belief state of other
individuals before two years of age [18]. While it is surely the case
that these abilities are supplemented by more sophisticated and
explicit propositional representations of mental states with age, it
seems unlikely that these low-level mindreading processes become
obsolete. It is plausible to suggest that these processes might be
engaged in our task due to its emphasis on making sense of
behaviour rather than naming a mental state. Given the changing
views on the nature of mentalising processes, it seems ever more
important to channel our efforts into devising tasks such as the one
reported here that closely approximate how we understand other
people’s behaviour in real life situations.
In summary, from a brief sample of a few seconds of behaviour,
adults are able to infer an event that happened to another
individual. This appears to be evidence of a powerful retrodictive
mindreading process, which might allow us to benefit indirectly
from the experiences of others. Looking at the eyes was not a
successful strategy for deducing what had happened to the
individual in question, and participants tended to vary their
viewing strategy according to what the individual in the video had
actually experienced. This suggests that participants are affected
by the cues present in the person’s behaviour to attend to the parts
that will be most informative for making sense of it.
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